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Unintended Consequences of Repression: Alliance Formation 
in South Korea’s Democracy Movement (1970-1979)
Paul Y. Chang, Singapore Management University
Research regarding the impact of repression on social movements 
has yielded conflicting findings; some argue that repression 
decreases the total quantity of protest events while others argue 
that it motivates protest. To move beyond this impasse, various 
scholars have suggested exploring how repression influences 
the quality of social movements. This study assesses the 
impact repression had on the formation of alliances between 
different social groups participating in South Korea’s democracy 
movement. Results from negative binomial regression analyses 
show that repression facilitated the formation of alliances 
between movement actors at a time when the overall number of 
protest events decreased. This study contributes to the literature 
on coercion and mobilization by pointing to the possibility of 
movement development during low levels of a protest cycle.
Recent studies of social movements have identified repression as 
one important aspect of the larger political opportunity structure that 
significantly shapes movement trajectories (Davenport, Johnston and 
Mueller 2005; Zwerman and Steinhoff 2005; Earl 2003, 2006; Goldstone 
and Tilly 2001; della Porta 1996). Empirical findings from past studies 
have revealed a “paradox” regarding the impact of repression on social 
movements (Brockett 2005, 1995). While some argue that repression 
reduces movement vitality (Olzak, Beasley and Olivier 2003) because of 
the added costs associated with repression (Tilly 1978), others argue that 
repression increases the rate of protest and collective action (White 1989; 
Khawaja 1993, 1994). In reviews of this literature researchers have puzzled 
over the fact that, “Both threats and opportunities can mobilize activism… 
For some challengers, increased political openness enhances the prospects 
for mobilization, while other movements seem to respond more to threat 
than opportunity.” (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996:1645,1634; see also Earl 
2006; Lichbach 1987).    
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And still, other scholars have argued for a non-linear relationship 
between repression and protest. But even here the non-monotonic 
pattern describing the impact of repression on protest is contested. Some 
argue that the relationship between repression and protest takes on an 
inverted U shape; lower levels of repression might offer the opportunity 
to express grievances and thus motivate participation in protest events. If 
the repression becomes severe, the costs associated with participating 
in protest might be too high, eventually leading to movement decline 
(Brockett 2005; Muller 1985; Weede 1987). Others, however, argue the 
reverse; repression is a threat to movement participants and initially 
deters protest activity. If this repression is determined unjust, the same 
repression can lead to the radicalization of a movement and facilitate 
further protest (Opp and Roehl 1990; Rasler 1996).  
The above conflicting findings have led some to the unhelpful conclusion 
that “there are theoretical arguments for all conceivable basic relationships 
between government coercion and group protest and rebellion, except 
for no relationship.” (Zimmerman 1980:191 as quoted in Lichbach 
1987:267) While the relationship between repression and protest is indeed 
complicated, past studies have primarily analyzed the most general and 
public component of a social movement: overall count or rate of protest 
events (Olzak, Beasley and Olivier 2003; Rasler 1996; Opp and Roehl 1990; 
Barkan 1984). As Hoover and Kowalewski (1992:156) recognize, however, 
studies that use overall protest event count as the main dependent variable 
“are limited by their use of single dimensions of dissent and repression.”. 
While repression might increase or decrease (or both) the count of protest 
events, we can gain greater insight into the impact of repression on social 
movements if we look more closely at how movement form changes as it 
interacts with repressive state organs (McAdam 1996). 
One helpful way to disentangle the relationship between repression and 
protest is to disaggregate a movement into its various parts and assess 
how repression affects individual components. That is, we can shift our 
focus away from the total quantity of protest events, as in most event 
count studies, to the quality of movement characteristics. Loveman (1998), 
for example, has shown that movement actors in Latin America were 
motivated to establish social movement organizations during heightened 
periods of repression (see also Chang and Kim 2007). In addition, several 
scholars have shown that movement actors will alter their tactical strategy 
when confronted with repression (McAdam 1983; Lichbach 1987; Moore 
1998; Titarenko, McCarthy, McPhail and Augustyn 2001), while others 
have found that high levels of repression motivate the construction and 
development of movement frames (Davenport and Eads 2001; Chang and 
Kim 2007). Thus, an increase in organizational capacity, changes in the 
tactical repertoire and frame development are just a few of the various 
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(unintended) consequences of repression. This study contributes to this 
growing literature by showing how different forms of repression motivated 
the formation of alliances between social groups participating in South 
Korea’s democracy movement.
Drawing from the literature on coalition building and alliance formation, 
I empirically explicate the impact of outgroup contention on ingroup 
solidarity in the case of South Korea’s democracy movement. Based on 
analyses of a novel time-series events dataset, I show that the attempts to 
repress the democracy movement by the Korean authoritarian state, with 
the passing of repressive laws and increasing police coverage of protest, 
galvanized solidarity within the movement, even as it decreased the total 
number of protest events. Various movement actors were motivated to 
create alliances with each other during the most authoritarian period in 
Korea’s modern history and when the state became increasingly efficient 
at policing protest. This study highlights the usefulness of specifying the 
differential impact repression has on various movement characteristics 
and contributes to the theoretical literature on coercion and mobilization 
by raising the possibility of movement development during low levels of 
a protest cycle.
Authoritarianism in South Korea
General Park Chung Hee’s coup d’etat on May 16, 1961 marked the 
beginning of successive military regimes in South Korea that lasted until 
democratic reforms were instituted in 1987. Immediately after the coup, 
Park dissolved the National Assembly, instituted martial law and began 
the campaign to consolidate his power by arresting, threatening and 
eliminating opposing figures. Park also strategically placed many of his 
military cohorts in positions of power. In 1961 the Korean CIA was created 
by Kim Jong-pil (Park’s military subordinate and nephew by marriage) and 
within three years this repressive organization developed a vast network 
of agents that monitored any opposition in Korean society. Partly due to 
pressure from the United States to restore the democratic constitution, 
Park reinstituted direct presidential elections. Park officially retired from 
the military in December of 1962 and ran for the presidency in the 
1963 election. Through various manipulative methods Park succeeded 
in winning the election and thus became the third president of South 
Korea. Park organized the state-government into executive, judicial and 
legislative branches.   
Throughout the 1960s Park focused governmental efforts at indus-
trializing and developing the economy of the country with a series of “five 
year plans.” Orchestrated by the Economic Planning Board, South Korea’s 
economy was transformed from an agricultural based economy to one 
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concentrated in the manufacturing of export goods (Shin 1998). Aided by 
the influx of foreign resources in the forms of grants and loans, first from 
the United States and then Japan, Park Chung Hee’s economic strategy 
was successful in raising the GNP 7.8 percent from 1962 through 1966 and 
another 10.5 percent 1967-1971 (Oh 1991). Overall per capita real income 
rose from 87 U.S. dollars in 1962 to 293 dollars in 1972. As the export 
driven economy created the demand for labor, unemployment dropped 
from 8.3 percent in 1963 to 4.5 percent by 1971 (Oh 1991). 
The state’s development strategy of the 1960s and 70s helped catapult 
South Korea from a war-torn nation in 1953 to the 13th largest national 
economy it is today. All of this occurred in a relatively brief period of time, 
and “South Korea was unrivaled, even by Japan, in the speed with which it 
went from having almost no industrial technology to taking its place among 
the world’s industrialized nations.” (Vogel 1991:59) Park appropriated the 
economic gains to mount a propaganda campaign because “he needed 
economic progress to defend his political base against those who regarded 
his seizure of power as illegitimate.” (Vogel 1991:51) Park used economic 
success as a main platform to win reelection in 1967 for his second and 
supposedly last term as president.
Park did not abdicate at the end of his second term and instead forced 
the National Assembly to amend the existing constitution to allow him 
to run for a third term in 1971. Again through coercive tactics Park won 
the election, but by the end of 1972 frustrations with the existing political 
system led Park to enact the Yusin Constitution.1 The Yusin Constitution 
ended Korea’s brief experiment with democracy and concentrated all 
political power in the executive branch. Limitations on presidential tenure 
were lifted and all future “presidents” were to be chosen indirectly by the 
National Council for Unification which was in turn headed by the president. 
Although the National Assembly was allowed to meet again, under the 
Yusin Constitution the president had the power to directly appoint a 
third of the seats in the assembly, effectively guaranteeing support of 
the legislature. All members of the judicial system, from local judges to 
Constitutional Court justices, were appointed directly by the president 
without the possibility of veto by political parties. All of these political 
moves severed whatever democratic processes were upheld in the 1960s 
and in all practicality “transformed the presidency into a legal dictatorship.” 
(Eckert et. al. 1991:365) Replacing the existing constitution with the new 
Yusin constitution was in effect an “in house” coup d’etat. 
The Emergency Decree Era
Throughout the 1970s, Park’s Yusin regime became increasingly autocratic. 
In addition to the Yusin Constitution that drastically limited the democratic 
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participation of citizens, Park Chung Hee issued a series of “Emergency 
Decrees” that further facilitated the closing of the political opportunity 
structure. The Presidential EDs were ad hoc laws or measures that Park 
used to address situations as they arose and did not need the approval of 
the National Assembly. EDs 1 and 2, issued on Jan. 8, 1974, disallowed 
criticism of the Yusin Constitution and forbade anti-government petition 
drives, respectively. On April 3, 1974, Park promulgated ED 4 which 
illegalized key student political organizations, and a year later (April 8, 1975) 
issued ED 7 which closed down Korea University, a hotbed of student 
activism. And finally, on May 13, 1975, Park issued the infamous ED 9 
that illegalized all forms of criticism of the government and was worded 
vaguely enough to be applied to almost all protest situations. “Legally” 
justified by the EDs, the government began its systematic repression 
of the democracy movement utilizing various coercive tactics including 
arrest, torture and murder. The “Emergency Decree Era” (1974-1979), 
then, constitutes the most authoritarian and repressive period of South 
Korea’s modern history. The EDs were relatively successful in subduing 
the democracy movement as evident in the decline of protest events 
following the promulgation of ED 9. 
As can be seen in Figure 1 the total number of protest events spiked 
from 1971 to 1972 primarily due to two reasons. First, Park’s efforts to 
amend the existing constitution to allow him to run for a third presidential 
Figure 1. Monthly Counts of Protest Events (1970-1979)
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Figure 1. Monthly Counts of Protest Events (1970-1979) 
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Figure 2. Monthly Repression Index Score (1970-1979) 
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term sparked public outrage. In addition, in order to discipline and subdue 
the protest-prone university students, Park Chung Hee’s government 
increased the number of hours of mandatory military training exercises on 
university campuses.2 This new military training policy infuriated students 
who took to the streets in mass demonstrations. The number of public 
protest dropped significantly in 1972 mainly due to martial law and the 
garrison decree ordered by Park to support his new Yusin Constitution. 
During most of that year, universities were closed down, curfews were 
stringently enforced, and the military patrolled the city streets in full 
force (e.g., tanks and other heavy military equipment were placed in 
strategic locations throughout the city of Seoul and other large urban 
centers). Dissidents began anti-government protests after martial law was 
lifted and the number of protest events steadily rose from 1973 through 
1975. However, the number of protest events again dropped after the 
Table 1: Social Groups Participating in Protest Events (1970-1979) 

Table 1: Social Groups Participating in Protest Events (1970-1979) 
 
Social Group Frequency Percent
Students/youth 690 31.71 
Laborers/workers 370 17.00 
Christians (Protestant & Catholic) 359 16.50 
Journalist/media personnel 139 6.39 
Christian students 137 6.30 
Intellectuals 118 5.42 
Politicians (and staff) 96 4.41 
Professionals 37 1.70 
Family of prisoners 37 1.70 
General activists/civil groups 33 1.52 
Prisoners 27 1.24 
Foreigners (including diaspora) 18 .83 
Educators/school officials 15 .69 
Other religious 12 .55 
Christian farmers 11 .51 
Citizens (general) 7 .32 
Urban poor 6 .28 
Farmers 5 .23 
Student prisoners 4 .18 
Other 3 .14 
Judges/judicial system staff 2 .09 
Merchants 2 .09 
Other religiously identified students 2 .09 
Christian prisoners 2 .09 
Military personnel 1 .05 
(MISSING) 43 1.98 
Total 2176 100 
 
 Source: Stanford Korea Democracy Project Events Dataset (1970-1979)
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promulgation of the EDs in 1974 and 1975 and aside from the martial law 
period in 1972, reached its lowest points in 1976 and 1977. In the Korean 
case then, state repression was relatively effective in reducing the total 
quantity of protest events in the latter half of the 1970s. But still, questions 
remain as to what impact this repression had on the quality and type of 
protest events that occurred during the highly repressive ED era. 
Coalitions and Alliances in Social Movements
Large-scale social movements rarely involve a single group of actors. Rather, 
movements are often staged by actors from multiple sectors of society 
(Staggenborg 1986; Rucht 2004; Almeida 2005; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 
2005; Whittier 1997). As Staggenborg (1986:374) found in the Pro-Choice 
Movement, “…modern social movements are not monolithic entities, but 
consist of shifting coalitions of constituents from varying backgrounds.” After 
the establishment of the Yusin Constitution, various social groups in South 
Korean society joined the movement to restore democracy. While students 
were the first to initiate anti-government protests, they were quickly followed 
by laborers, Christians, intellectuals, journalists, marginalized politicians and 
other social groups. Thus, South Korea’s democracy movement in the 1970s 
constituted a diverse range of actors. 
With the diversification of social groups participating in a movement 
comes the potential for alliances between them. As Shaffer (2000:112) 
found in the environmentalist movement, “…the rich diversity of groups 
which comprise the environmental movement provides an ideal setting 
for exploring the dynamics of coalition participation among movement 
organizations.” The importance of coalition building for the success of 
social movements has been reported in several studies (Rucht 2004; Shaffer 
2000; Van Dyke 2003; Staggenborg 1986; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 
2005; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Bystydzienski and Schacht 2001). 
The formation of alliances between different groups working towards 
a common end can contribute to the vitality of a social movement by 
motivating protest events, increasing the pool of resources, and facilitating 
frame development. Indeed, scholars have argued that the additional 
resources and leverage coalitions bring to a movement contribute to 
its overall success (Van Dyke 2003; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005; 
Staggenborg 1986; Shaffer 2000; Rucht 2004). Brockett (2005:322), for 
example, argues that the differences in outcomes between successful 
social movements in Nicaragua and the legacy of state terrorism in El 
Salvador and Guatemala are partly due to the lack of interclass coalitions 
in the latter countries.  
Movement scholars have identified both internal and external mechan-
isms that facilitate coalition work between social groups participating in a 
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social movement. While it is not the focus of this study, scholars have pointed 
to various internal factors that galvanize alliances such as the organizational 
structure of SMOs in a movement (Staggenborg 1986; Shaffer 2000), ability 
of dissidents to construct a common frame or movement identity (Barvosa-
Carter 2001; Boudreau 2004; Van Dyke 2003; Croteau and Hicks 2003; 
Griggs and Howarth 2002; McCammon and Campbell 2002), and whether 
or not there is coalitional precedence or a shared history of working together 
(Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005; Boudreau 2004). 
In addition to the internal factors are external mechanisms that act 
as a catalyst for coalition building or alliance formation between diverse 
movement actors. Scholars have pointed specifically to the external 
political opportunity structure that can galvanize coalition work and as 
Meyer and Corrigall-Brown (2005:327) note, “…external circumstances, 
or political opportunities, are critically important factors that affect the 
propensity of social movement organizations to cooperate in common 
cause.” While early work on political opportunity structures focused on 
expanding or increased opportunities, recent work has included “threat” 
or the contraction of the opportunity structure as a significant external 
influence on movement development (Goldstone and Tilly 2001). 
Based on Goldstone and Tilly’s (2001) reformulation of the political 
opportunity thesis, scholars have pointed to the facilitating capacity of 
increased threat for movement development including alliance formation 
between different movement actors (McCammon and Campbell 2002; 
Van Dyke 2003; Boudreau 1996, 2004; Shaffer 2000; Staggenborg 1986; 
Almeida 2005; Alves 2001). In this view, repression can lead to a change 
in tactical strategy by movement actors to compensate for the heightened 
threat (Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998) and coalition building or alliance 
formation between actors is one such strategy (McCammon and Campbell 
2002; Boudreau 1996, 2004; Van Dyke 2003; Almeida 2005; Alves 2001). 
Repression is a relatively large factor in an authoritarian context when 
other political recourse such as legal recognition of basic rights and 
habeas corpus are suspended. The centralization of power in authoritarian 
states, while contributing to a higher level of repressive capacity, ironically 
provides diverse movement actors a unique motivation for cooperative 
work. As Tarrow (1998:82) points out, “In authoritarian settings… the 
centralization of power offers dissidents an odd sort of advantage – a 
unified field and a centralized target to attack…” 
The flip side to the centralization of power in authoritarian states is the 
tendency for movements that challenge autocratic regimes to be diverse, 
originating from a wide variety of social sectors (Almeida 2005). The 
authoritarian state inadvertently motivates different challengers to join the 
movement against it because its policies are applied to all social sectors 
within its political jurisdiction. In regards to repression, “Authoritarian states 
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also unintentionally create multiple oppositional groups by committing 
repressive acts against more than one sector.” (Almeida 2005:71) In 
turn, this can motivate alliances between the disparate social groups 
participating in anti-government protests because “A common enemy that 
simultaneously affects multiple constituencies or widely shared identities 
facilitates the formation of coalitions.” (Van Dyke 2003:228) Based on the 
above discussion, I suggest the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Higher levels of repression facilitate 
alliance formation amongst diverse social actors 
participating in protest.
 
We can further specify various forms of repression including both 
structural or institutional repression and immediate or situational repression 
(Koopmans 1997). The authoritarian Korean state passed repressive laws that 
further closed the already limited political opportunity structure. The passing 
of the Emergency Decrees signified the beginning of a highly repressive 
period in the 1970s and can be construed as the legal manifestation of 
institutional repression. To assess the specific effects of institutional 
repression on alliance formation, I test the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: There will be more cases of alliance 
formation between social groups during the highly 
repressive ED Era than prior to the passing of these laws.
In addition, repression can take more immediate forms such as the 
“policing of protest.” (Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003; della Porta 1996) 
Authority presence at protest events constitutes immediate forms of 
repression when police contain, beat and arrest protestors. As Earl, Soule 
and McCarthy (2003) have found, however, state authorities do not respond 
to every situation they face and not all protest events are repressed. 
That is, using a media analogy, the differential rate of police presence at 
protest events reflects the “repressive coverage” capacity of the state. The 
variability of police presence at protest events, and the multiple types of 
repression tactics they employ, leaves the possibility of assessing change 
in the levels of repressive coverage and the impact of this change on 
alliance formation. To assess the particular effects of situational repression 
on alliance formation, I test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Increasing repressive coverage, as 
operationalized by the number and severity of repression 
events, facilitates alliance formation between social 
groups participating in protest.
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And finally, because alliance-forming events are a subset of the overall 
protest count, it is possible that different degrees of repression have 
varying impact on alliance formation. As noted above, some scholars 
have argued for a curvilinear relationship between repression and protest. 
In this study, I specifically test the argument that repression has a non-
monotonic inverted U shape relationship with protest; lower levels or 
less severe forms of repression increase grievances and motivate protest 
while extreme forms of repression produce too high of a cost to dissidents 
and thus diminish protest activity. To assess the merits of this argument I 
test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Less severe forms of repression increase 
the number of alliance forming protest events and 
extreme forms of repression decrease it.
Data and Methods
The Stanford Korea Democracy Project
To test the hypotheses that different forms of repression facilitate alliance 
formation amongst diverse social groups, I use a novel cross-sectional 
time series events dataset that is part of the Stanford Korea Democracy 
Project.3 For the years 1970-1979, there are 2,954 events recorded in this 
dataset and includes various attributes of protest and repression events. 
This dataset is unique for two reasons. First, the dataset includes both 
protest and repression events with a different set of variables describing 
characteristics of each. Second, the dataset includes a “link” variable 
that shows the specific sequenced relationships between the different 
events in the dataset. 
This dataset represents the most exhaustive effort to quantify protest 
and repression events relating to South Korea’s democracy movement. 
While the main source for Korea democracy related event datasets has 
been newspaper accounts in past studies (Shin 1984, 2002), the Stanford 
KDP datasets are based on sourcebooks compiled by the Korea Democracy 
Foundation. The Korea Democracy Foundation was established by the 
South Korean government in 2002 to commemorate and memorialize the 
democracy movement. One of its main objectives is to archive all materials 
relating to the democracy movement. To create the sourcebooks, the KDF 
drew upon any and all materials documenting democracy movement related 
events; they not only utilized newspapers, but also government documents, 
SMO archives, personal memoirs and other primary manuscripts. Their 
efforts yielded more than 3,000 pages of narrative accounts of protest and 
repression events from 1970-1993. Codebooks were created using as a 
template the coding manual for a different and independent event dataset 
Consequences of Repression  • 11
(Olzak and West 1995) and are available upon request. The codebooks were 
then used to quantify the KDF sourcebooks.  While there are limitations 
to the KDF sourcebooks and consequentially the dataset, it is the most 
systematic account of Korea’s democracy movement to date.4   
By creating and analyzing the Stanford KDP Dataset, I hope to 
satisfy critics of previous studies that utilized cross-sectional data and/
or relied exclusively on newspaper accounts. Many advocate the need 
for longitudinal or cross-sectional time series datasets when analyzing 
movement evolution and change (Olzak 1989; Oliver 1993; Meyer and 
Staggenborg 1996; Hoover and Kowalewski 1992; Moore 2000; Francisco 
1995; Zwerman and Steinhoff 2005). The Stanford KDP Dataset was created 
with these concerns in mind and reports start and end dates for all events. 
Also, many have pointed to the limitations of newspaper accounts for 
gathering information on protest events (Barranco and Wisler 1999; Hocke 
1998; McCarthy, McPhail and Smith 1996; Smith, McCarthy, McPhail and 
Augustyn 2001; Oliver and Maney 2000; Woolley 2000). The Stanford KDP 
Dataset addresses this concern by utilizing the KDF sourcebooks that 
pooled information from a variety of sources. 
Dependent Variable: Alliance
Alliances between movement actors have been conceptualized and 
operationlized in the empirical literature in different ways. There are a 
wide variety of types of coalition work between disparate movement 
groups (Rucht 2004; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005). Coalition work 
amongst dissidents range between relatively “tight” and formal inter-
organizational linkages to more “loose” alliances, such as recognizing 
another group’s actions and offering moral support. In this study, I adopt 
Rucht’s (2004:202) definition of alliance formation: “As long as these 
parts [different groups] deliberately seek to support each other, they 
form an alliance within or as a social movement.” 
Rucht’s broadly encompassing definition of alliances between diverse 
movement groups captures the wide range of coalition work occurring in 
large scaled social movements and is especially useful for identifying more 
subtle forms of alliance formation in movements that emerge in a highly 
repressive context. A loose definition of alliances is appropriate in 1970s 
Korea where important social groups such as Christians, journalists and 
intellectuals first joined the democracy movement and significant formal 
coalitions were not formed until the mid to late 1980s (Koo 2001; Kim 
2000; Oh 1999). But still, while formal coalitions between groups such as 
students and labor were indeed critical to the success of the democracy 
movement in the 1980s (Lee 2007, 2002), research that focuses only on 
formal coalitions miss the importance of the initial foundation-building 
steps toward inter-group solidarity in the 1970s.  
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Thus, in this study, I conceptualize alliance formation as the connection 
between two protesting groups when one group, in a protest event, 
recognizes the protest efforts of another group and explicitly declares 
solidarity with that other group. These alliance-forming events can be 
divided into within group alliances and between group alliances. First, it 
can be that a social group recognizes the mobilization efforts of a similar 
social group (e.g., students recognizing other students). The second case 
is where one social group recognizes and supports a different social 
group (e.g., Christians standing in solidarity with laborers). Substantively, 
the ALLIANCE variable represents between group alliance formation and 
is operationalized as the monthly count of all protest events in the KDP 
dataset where one social group recognized and declared solidarity with 
a different social group. Based on this conceptualization, 327 events out 
of a total of 1,845 protest events were coded as alliance forming events 
between two different social groups. Table 2 reports the annual count of 
between group alliance events versus all other events.
Independent Variables: Institutional Repression
As mentioned above, there are different types of repression and I 
operationalize both institutional and situational forms (Koopmans 1997). 
Institutional or structural repression is a key aspect of an authoritarian 
state’s repressive strategy. The democracy movement can be divided 
into two periods in the 1970s. Park’s promulgation of the EDs, starting 
in 1974, changed the political opportunity structure in significant ways. 
The EDs made illegal all political public gatherings and provided the 
legal justification for arbitrary arrest and incarceration. Also in 1974, 
the government went on the offensive against the student movement 
by systematically hunting down and imprisoning hundreds of student 
Table 2: Count of Alliance Forming Events vs. All Other Events by Year

Table 2: Aggregated Annual Count of Alliance Forming Events vs. All Other Events  
 
Year Alliance Events All Other Events Total 
70 0 (0) 123 (100) 123 (100) 
71 10 (2.32) 421 (97.68) 432 (100) 
72 0 (0) 44 (100) 44 (100) 
73 27 (12.86) 183 (87.14) 211 (100) 
74 137 (50.18) 136 (49.82) 273 (100) 
75 65 (22.41) 225 (77.59) 290 (100) 
76 14 (18.67) 61 (81.33) 75 (100) 
77 12 (14.12) 73 (85.88) 85 (100) 
78 30 (17.65) 140 (82.35) 170 (100) 
79 32 (22.22) 112 (77.78) 144 (100) 
Total 327 (17.72) 1518 (82.28) 1845 (100) 
 Source: Stanford Korea Democracy Project Events Dataset (1970-1979)
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leaders. This “minchung incident” (named after the nation-wide student 
organization Democratic Youth and Student Association), along with 
the EDs, marked the beginning of the most repressive period in Korea’s 
modern history. In order to capture the variation in authoritarian settings in 
the 1970s, I use a time-dummy variable signifying those events that took 
place in the “Emergency Decree Era” and those that did not. The variable 
Table 3: Repression Index Categorization, Weights and Frequency (1970-1979)

 
Table 3: Repression Index Categorization, Weights and Frequency (1970-1979) 
 
Severity of Repression (Weight)   
Type of  Repression Event Frequency Percent 
Mild Repression (1)   
Denial of  petition or request 14 .54 
Spoken critique or threat 126 4.84 
Government propaganda 2 .08 
Bribing 2 .08 
Subtotal 144 5.54 
Moderate Repression (2)   
Surveillance or spying 26 1.00 
Censoring 44 1.69 
Illegalizing movement organization 24 .92 
Harsher working conditions 34 1.31 
Cooptation 12 .46 
Subtotal 140 5.38 
Heavy Repression (3)   
Containment, disruption or barricade 356 13.67 
Arrest or take into custody 1076 41.32 
Trashing office and confiscating files 14 .54 
Expulsion from school 62 2.38 
Interrogation or investigation 98 3.76 
Closing schools or stopping classes 128 4.92 
Wage cut or limiting funding source 16 .61 
Legal prosecution 20 .77 
Harsher treatment of  prisoners 12 .46 
Fired from job or forced resignation 130 4.99 
Closing down of  factory or company 16 .61 
Subtotal 1928 74.03 
Extreme Repression (4)   
Violence 348 13.36 
Forced assimilation or brain washing 16 .61 
Kidnapping 6 .23 
Death sentence 4 .15 
Murder 2 .08 
Deportation or denial of  visa 10 .38 
Physical humiliation 6 .23 
Subtotal 392 15.04 
Total 2604 100.00 
 Source: Stanford Korea Democracy Project Events Dataset (1970-1979)
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ED_ERA was created by identifying all events taking place after Jan. 8, 
1974, when the first two EDs were promulgated.
Independent Variables: Situational Repression
The passing of repressive laws, such as the EDs, signifies the closing of 
the political opportunity structure. Along with structural closure, repression 
also takes the immediate form of authority presence at protest events 
(della Porta 1996; Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003). A REPRESSION_INDEX 
was created in order to model the effects of immediate or situational 
repression on alliance formation in South Korea’s democracy movement. 
Situational repressive coverage has at least two dimensions to it and the 
REPRESSION_INDEX attempts to incorporate both. First, the total count of 
protest events that are repressed reflects the sensitivity of authorities to 
a social movement and their willingness to expend resources to subdue 
protest activities. Thus, taking into consideration the total count of repression 
events is the first step in creating an overall REPRESSION_INDEX. 
In addition, immediate or situational forms of coercion include a wide 
variety of repressive tactics including bribing, surveillance, censoring, 
containment, barricades, arrests, violence and more. These different 
types of repression events constitute qualitatively distinct experiences 
for protestors depending on the severity of the repressive action. To 
account for the variation in the severity of different repression types, I 
assign weights to all repression events following the categorizing scheme 
outlined in Table 3.
Types of repression events are first aggregated into a four-level ordinal 
variable where 1 denotes the mildest forms of repression and 4 represents 
extreme forms of repression. The choice of weights was an arbitrary one, 
guided only by the desire to reflect the simplest pattern of increasing 
severity. Thus, increasing levels of repressive severity are operationlized 
by a one-unit increase in the weight scale, and I do not impute any 
substantive interpretation to differences in weights other than “more or 
less severe.” To obtain internal reliability of the assignments of weights, 
four different coders independently categorized all repression types into 
the four-level ordinal classification. The four coders then met together 
to discuss any discrepancies between coders. There were only three 
inconsistencies in the coding of repression types and the coders went back 
to the sourcebooks to reread the narrative accounts of these repression 
events. After some deliberation, the four coders reached consensus on 
the categorization of repression types.
   Building on the steps outlined above, the REPRESSION_INDEX is a 
weighted-count variable derived from the following equation:
Rlt = ∑CitWi
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Where t denotes a one month time interval, i represents a particular 
repression type, RIt equals the Repression Index score at time t, Cit is 
the count of repression type i at time t, and Wi represents the weight of 
repression type i. As evident in the equation, the REPRESSION _INDEX 
reflects the total count of repression events in a month’s time but also 
gives additional incremental weight to more severe forms of repression. 
The distribution of the REPRESSION_INDEX in monthly time spells is 
displayed in Figure 2.   
Finally, using the weighting scheme reported in Table 3, I distinguish 
between mild to heavy types of repression events and extreme forms of 
repression events. Various specifications were attempted to recategorize 
repression events into degrees of severity and based on narrative 
descriptions of the types of repression in other cases studies (e.g. Brockett 
2005), separating repression events by weight categories 1-3 and weight 
category 4 best matched the classification of repression types found in 
the other cases. Bifurcating a continuous or ordinal variable into “low” 
and “high” levels is a common way to model curvilinear relationships (see 
for example, Olzak and Uhrig 2001). By including measures of the count 
of mild to heavy repression events and extreme forms of repression, we 
can empirically test the hypothesis that less severe forms of repression 
motivate protest while extreme forms of repression decrease all protest 
activities including the formation of alliances between social groups.  
Figure 2. Monthly Repression Index Score (1970-1979)

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Control Variables
In addition to variables measuring institutional and situational repression, 
the models control for the number of social groups participating in protest 
events through a diversity measure: DIVERSITY_GROUP. The diversity of 
social groups participating in protest is calculated using the Simpson 
Diversity Index (Olzak and Ryo 2007). It is a proportional statistic and 
values range between 0 (no diversity, only one group participating in 
that month) and 1 (only a theoretical possibility of complete diversity).5 
I control for diversity based on the assumption that the potential for 
alliances between social groups is directly related to the number of 
groups participating in protest.
I also control for the larger economic context by introducing macro-
economic indicators into the models. I control for changes in GDP during 
the 1970s. GDP is measured in Korean currency (won) fixed at the value 
for year 2000. Because only quarterly data are available, I impute the same 
GDP datum for months in a single quarter, assuming no variation within a 
given quarter. Tracking GDP helps measure the rapid changes South Korea 
underwent during the the 1970s. Again, Park’s state-driven economic 
policies put Korea in the fast lane to industrialization and important social 
changes occurred during this time including rapid urbanization and the shift 
from agriculture to manufacturing as the foundation of Korea’s economy. 
Thus, it is quite feasible that this changing economic context influenced 
participation in protest events.
Finally, I also include the variable UNEMPLOYMENT_RATE in the analyses. 
Overall increase in GDP is a sign of economic transformation but a growing 
national economy does not necessarily mean equal distribution or access 
to resources. Thus, as a measure of economic grievance I include the 
unemployment rate calculated as the percentage of employable persons 
without jobs. The data are only available quarterly, and I impute equal 
unemployment rates for each set of three months in a given quarter.
Methods
Because the dependent variable is an aggregated non-negative monthly 
count of ALLIANCE events, event count models are appropriate. Following 
convention in the literature, the population of protest events is treated as 
the unit of analysis at risk for an alliance event to occur (Olzak 1989; Barron 
1992; Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Swaminathan 1995). Modeling based 
on the Poisson distribution is one way to analyze event count data (Olzak 
1989; Barron 1992). However, because the distribution of the ALLIANCE 
variable is overly dispersed and the variance (s 2 = 7.51) is greater than the 
mean (m = 2.73), modeling based on the Poisson process can lead to the 
misspecification of standard errors for coefficients (Swaminathan 1995). To 
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account for over-dispersion, a more general form of the Poisson process, 
the negative binomial distribution, can be used. The negative binomial 
process relaxes the assumption that the mean and variance are equal by 
including an over dispersion parameter (Barron 1992; Swaminathan 1995). 
Specifically, the negative binomial model allows the mean of the Poisson 
distribution to vary based on a fixed parameter given by the gamma 
distribution (Barron 1992). Negative binomial models are estimated with 
the following equation:
In λt = a + bXt + e
Where lt is the rate of alliance forming events occurring at time t, a is a 
constant, b are the coefficients for the vector of covariates Xt, and e is an 
error term. Finally, in building the models, I lag the REPRESSION_INDEX 
variable and all control variables by one month in order to temporally 
isolate the causal direction of effects.    
Results
Table 4 reports results from negative binomial regression analyses of alliance 
forming event counts. Maximum likelihood methods are used to estimate 
parameters of the independent and control variables. Model 1 is the baseline 
model and includes only our control variables. The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient for the DIVERSITY_GROUP variable indicates that 
the increasing diversity of social groups participating in protest events 
contributed to the growing number of alliances created between them. 
This finding is intuitive as alliances are only possible once a multi-actor field 
is established. In addition, Model 1 indicates that GDP has a statistically 
significant positive impact on alliance formation; as South Korea’s GDP 
increased over time, so did alliances between movement actors.
Model 2 introduces the first independent variable used to measure 
structural or institutional repression and significantly improves upon 
Model 1 (LR Test = 9.92, significant at the .01 level). As described 
above, the ED_ERA variable distinguishes between events that occurred 
during the Emergency Decree era and those that occurred prior to the 
passing of these repressive laws. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient indicates that alliance forming events were more likely to 
occur during the highly repressive ED period than prior to these decrees. 
Extrapolating from the raw coefficient, Model 2 reports that events that 
occurred during the ED era are 3.92 times [exp(1.365)] more likely to be 
an alliance forming event than events that took place prior to the EDs. 
This large effect indicates that most all alliance forming events occurred 
during the ED period.
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In Model 3, the ED_ERA variable is replaced by the second independent 
variable measuring immediate or situational repression. Model 3 indicates 
that increases in the repression index score have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the count of alliance forming events in a given month. 
Technically, the incidence rate of alliance forming events is estimated to 
increase 1.01 times [exp(.009)], or 1 percent, with one-unit increase in 
the repression index score. It is evident that, while the effect is relatively 
small, social groups were more likely to recognize and stand in solidarity 
with other groups as the authoritarian regime increased the number and 
severity of police coverage of protest events. Model 3 also significantly 
improves upon base Model 1 (LR Test = 5.10, significant at the .05 level).
In our full model, both institutional and situational forms of repression 
are included in the analysis. Model 4 reports that while controlling for 
the other, both forms of repression positively and significantly increase 
the count of alliance forming events. Compared to events prior to the ED 
Table 4: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Effects of 
Repression on Alliance Formation

Table 4: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Effects of Repression on Alliance Formation 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Repression Variables     
ED_ERA – 1.365***
(.409) – 
1.517***
(.399) 
1.349***
(.405) 
Repression_Index (t-1) – – .009* 
(.005) 
.011* 
(.004) 
– 
Mild to heavy repression (t-1) – – – – .061* 
(.024) 
Extreme repression (t-1) – – – – -.137 
(.106) 
Control Variables      
Diversity_Group (t-1) 2.991***
(.716) 
2.381***
(.750) 
2.514***
(.704) 
1.821* 
(.715) 
1.879**
(.707) 
GDP (t-1) .775* 
(.331) 
.397 
(.320) 
.463 
(.319) 
.046 
(.296) 
.087 
(.289) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) .167 
(.185) 
.187 
(.191) 
.040 
(.181) 
.033 
(.185) 
-.054 
(.188) 
Constant -3.607** 
(1.279) 
-3.333**
(1.231) 
-2.421 
(1.304) 
-2.067 
(1.218) 
-1.775 
(1.202) 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
LR Chi2  
(df) 
18.65*** 
(3) 
28.57*** 
(4) 
23.74***
(4) 
36.64***
(5) 
39.12*** 
(6) 
LR test  
(Model 1 vs. Models 2, 3, 4, 5)  9.92** 5.10* 17.99*** 20.47*** 
 
 Notes: *p , .05    **p , .01    ***p , .001 (two-tailed test)
(t-1) indicates variable measured one month prior to the dependent variable.
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era, events that occurred during the height of authoritarianism were 4.56 
times [exp(1.517)] more likely to be an alliance forming event. Furthermore, 
one additional unit increase in the repression index score increased the 
number of alliance forming events 1.01 times [exp(.011)]. To sum, alliances 
between diverse social groups participating in the democracy movement 
were more likely to be formed during the highly repressive ED era and 
were also facilitated by the increasing state repressive coverage of protest 
events. Model 4 significantly improves upon our base model (LR Test = 
17.99, significant at the .001 level).    
Finally, in Model 5 the types of situational repression are divided between 
those that fall under the “mild to heavy” categories and those classified 
as “extreme” repression (see Table 3). Model 5 tests the hypothesis that 
repression has a non-monotonic, inverted U shape effect on protest 
activity; lower levels of repressive threat promote protest activity and 
high or extreme forms of repression diminish mobilization. As reported 
in Model 5, increasing the count of mild to heavy repression events has 
a positive and significant effect on our dependent variable and accounts 
for a 1.06 time [exp(.061)], or 6 percent, increase in the count of alliance 
forming events in a given month. 
In addition, Model 5 reports that the coefficient for the effect of extreme 
forms of repression on alliance formation is not statistically significant (p = 
.195). This non-significant finding for extreme forms of repression suggests 
that it is the less severe forms of repression that is driving the count of 
alliance forming events in models 3 and 4. It is worth noting, however, that 
the coefficient is negative, possibly suggesting that a strategy of extreme 
repression might indeed decrease overall protest activity including alliance 
forming protest events. It is also important to acknowledge that while the 
types of extreme repression (e.g., kidnapping, death sentence, murder, 
etc.) are not unlike those found in other highly repressive contexts such 
as El Salvador and Guatemala, the overall number of these events are 
relatively small in comparison to those countries where tens of thousand 
were kidnapped and/or murdered (Brockett 2005). The question remains as 
to what would have happened if the South Korean state had implemented 
the same sort of wide-spread extreme repression found in these Central 
American countries.    
Discussion
The positive impact repression had on alliance formation in Korea’s 
democracy movement points to the importance of analyzing the dialectical 
interplay between authoritarian regimes and social movements. This study 
highlights the usefulness of considering the unintended consequences 
of state repression. In an authoritarian context, repression is a key factor 
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influencing the characteristics and evolution of social movements. Analyses 
of repression’s impact on overall protest event count have yielded conflicting 
findings and scholars have suggested specifying the effects of repression 
on disaggregated components of social movements (Lichbach 1987; 
Hoover and Kowalewski 1992). That is, while repression might decrease 
or increase overall protest event count, it also can facilitate the founding 
of social movement organizations (Loveman 1998; Chang and Kim 2007), 
alter the choice of protest tactics (McAdam 1983; Lichbach 1987; Moore 
1998; Titarenko et.al. 2001), motivate frame development (Davenport and 
Eads 2001; Chang and Kim 2007), and in the present case study, lead to the 
formation of alliances between different movement groups. 
The formation of alliances can, in turn, lead to practical advantages 
such as the pooling of material and cultural resources (Weiss 2006). To 
be sure, the alliances that were forged during the highly repressive ED 
period remained limited to identifying with and supporting other groups, 
but this still laid the groundwork for future solidarity work. These kinds of 
“informal ties” can be important for movement development and as Tarrow 
(1998:52) notes, “what movements needed to be successful were strong 
informal connective structures among heterogeneous and interdependent 
social groups and localities.” Awareness of the protest activities of 
different social groups, and an increasingly shared understanding of 
oppression, provides “the experience with which groups may… build 
cross-cutting coalitions…” (Weiss 2006:44) These shared experiences 
become “resources” or “coalitional capital” needed to facilitate solidarity 
in large social movements and for groups to pursue common goals (Weiss 
2006:32). Indeed, the strength and unity of Korea’s democracy movement 
in the 1980s, manifest in a variety of formal ecumenical umbrella social 
movement organizations, originate in the informal alliances that were 
created in the 1970s (Sunhyuk Kim 2000; Samuel Kim 2003).
In addition, movement development during periods of nadir has important 
implications for the literature on protest cycles. As seen in Figure 1, the 
total number of protest events declined following the promulgation of EDs 
in 1974 and 1975. And yet, more of the protest events that occurred in the 
highly repressive ED era constituted alliance-forming events compared 
to events that occurred during the relatively less repressive period. This 
in turn shows that while repression had a negative impact on the overall 
quantity of protest events, it still positively contributed to the quality of 
the movement as evident in the increasing solidarity between disparate 
movement actors. Thus, this study points to the possibility of continuing 
movement development during low points in a movement’s cycle.
Although Tarrow’s (1998) conceptual definition of protest cycles is not 
limited to a simple count of protest events, empirical operationalizations 
of high or low points in a cycle are often defined by the frequency of 
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protest events occurring in a given time period (Tarrow 1993; White 1993). 
Consequently, most scholars analyzing cycles of protest have focused on 
movement development during high periods of activism defined by event 
count. That is, scholars have argued that greater numbers of protest events 
are associated with movement “intensity,” founding of social movement 
organizations, creation of cultural frames, diversification of actors, tactics, 
and forms, and general diffusion processes (Tarrow 1993; Tarrow 1998; 
McAdam 1995). 
In contrast, this study reveals that movements continue to evolve 
during low points in the cycle, or during the “doldrums,” when the number 
of protest events is relatively small (Rupp and Taylor 1987; Scott 1987; 
Armstrong 2002). This is another manifestation of the “repression paradox,” 
namely that “Repressive states depress collective action of a conventional 
and a confrontational sort, but leave themselves open to unobtrusive 
mobilization which can signal solidarity that becomes a resource when 
opportunities arise.” (Tarrow 1998:85) In sum, by focusing on repression’s 
impact on total event count, and by highlighting movement development 
only during high periods of a protest cycle, we overlook the important 
adaptive strategies movement actors engage in to cope with increasing 
coercion. While maybe not evident in the number of inter-group protest 
events, or formal ecumenical social movement organizations founded, 
the formation of loose-based alliances is a critical initial step in the 
development of movement solidarity and one unintended consequence 
of repression.   
Notes
1.  Yusin means “revitalization” and is, significantly, the Korean equivalent of 
the Japanese word Meiji, the discursive hallmark of the latter country’s 
industrial-modernization drive in the late 19th and 20th centuries.
2.  Every eligible male in South Korea to this day is mandated to serve in the 
military and throughout the Park period university students were required 
to participate in military training exercises on campus. 
3.  For information go to: http://aparc.stanford.edu/research/stanford_korea_
democracy_project.
4.  While the Korea Democracy Foundation did make every effort to collect 
information on all protest and repression events related to Korea’s 
democracy movement, it is quite feasible that some events were 
overlooked because they were simply not recorded in any source. Given 
that, it is still likely that there was no systematic exclusion of sets of 
events. Also, there were cases where a single event was reported by 
different sources with inconsistent facts between two or more sources. 
In the cases where conflicting facts dealt with quantitative data (e.g., 
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number of participants at an event), we took the average number from 
all sources rather than adjudicate between the sources.
5.  The Simpson Diversity Index is calculated with the following equation:
 S = 1-(A/monthly_total)2 + (B/monthly_total)2 + (C/monthly_total)2 + . . .
 Where A is the number of events organized by group A in a months time, 
and B is the number of events organized by group B, etc. The denominator 
“monthly_total” is the total sum of the number of events organized by all 
groups and thus can exceed the number of actual events (e.g. when two 
or more groups participate in a single event together).
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